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ABSTRACT. Public procurement in development projects is important 
because operations co-funded by European Union must be in line with 
the applicable public procurement rules on national and EU levels. 
However in its annual report the European Court of Auditors reveals that 
errors occur in cohesion spending, and three quarter of these errors are 
due to serious failure in applying procurement rules.  
Given the current budgetary restrictions and economic difficulties in 
most Member States, public procurement policy must, more than ever, 
ensure the optimal use of funds in order foster growth and job creation. 
What is the cause of the high error rate?  
One reason for uncertainties and inefficiencies is the need for 
development projects to apply not only public procurement but also 
Cohesion Policy rules. These two sets of rules were written with quite 
different intentions and mind sets and can thus be contradictory. The 
uncertainties and incoherencies the public procurement versus 
Cohesion Policy rules has a significant effect as well of the number of 
irregularities.  
It's a clear hint in the direction of EU Member States to do their 
homework and learn how to handle proper public procurements. On the 
other hand, some of the irregularities will also be an effect of the still 
high and often unnecessary administrative burdens for Cohesion Policy 
accounting - an issue perpetuated at both EU and national level.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
EU Cohesion Policy aims to reduce the economic development gap 
between the poorest regions and other regions and between the 
poorest communities and other communities within the EU by 
providing EU co-finance to projects in the Member States. 
EU public procurement rules are aimed at guaranteeing that public 
contracts are awarded to the best bidder regardless of its nationality 
or place of establishment and as a consequence that public money is 
spent transparently and effectively. 
In the EU Cohesion Policy the development projects are co-financed 
by the Structural Funds. The Use of the Structural Funds must be in 
line with the applicable public procurement rules on national and EU 
levels in order to ensure value for money and competition on the 
procurement market. 
It seems that there are some obstacles in the progress of the EU co-
financed project’s implementation, because the European Court of 
Auditors report 7.7% of cohesion funding was spent in error or 
against EU rules.  
What is behind this number, what is the cause of the high error rate?  
How to avoid irregularities in public procurement procedures of EU 
funded projects?  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM OF COHESION 
POLICY 
 
Cohesion policy aims at strengthening economic and social cohesion 
within the European Union by reducing the gap in the level of 
development between different regions.  
The Cohesion Policy programmes co-funded by the EU budget help to 
transform regional and national economies through investment in 
infrastructure, business development, training, innovation and the 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND COHESION POLICY 
2235 
environment; they deliver long-term sustainable growth and 
contribute significantly to job creation. 
EU regional policy is financed by more funds: European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), Cohesion 
Fund (CF), European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA). Each of them has different regulation with 
different objectives and eligibility rules.  
The budget of the funds and the rules for its use are jointly decided by 
the Council and the European Parliament on the basis of a proposal 
from the Commission.  
The proper financial management of EU funds is important to avoid 
fraud and illegitimate spending. Yet more important is the quality of 
the funded projects. 
One of the key factors in the success of the policy is its decentralized 
delivery system. The programmes are managed at regional and local 
level so the projects selected respond to the priorities at those levels. 
But this is associated with a higher control risk because it increases 
the number of bodies involved and makes the control chain longer. 
The funds are governed by common rules and are subject to shared 
management by the European Commission and the Member States.  
The European Commission approves multiannual (7 year) operational 
programmes, together with indicative financial plans which include 
the EU contribution, on the basis of Member States’ proposals. 
Projects within the OPs are implemented by private individuals, 
associations, private or public undertakings or local, regional and 
national public bodies.  
Cohesion policy carries an inherent risk since its programmes are 
delivered by numerous organizations and systems, and involve very 
large numbers of diverse projects. 
Member States allocate responsibility for day-to-day administration. 
This includes the selection of individual projects, the implementation 
of controls to prevent, detect and correct errors within the declared 
expenditure and the verification that projects are actually 
implemented (‘first level checks’).  
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The Member States are responsible for carrying out system audits 
and audits of operations (i.e. projects or group of projects) in order to 
provide reasonable assurance on the effective functioning of the 
management and control systems of the programmes and on the 
regularity of the expenditure certified for each OP. They report on 
these audits to the European Commission through annual control 
reports and annual opinions. 
The European Commission has to obtain assurance that the Member 
States have set up management and control systems which meet the 
requirements of the regulations, and that the systems function 
effectively.  
If the European Commission finds that a Member State has failed to 
correct irregular expenditure or that there are serious failings in the 
management and control systems, it may interrupt or suspend 
payments†. If the Member State does not withdraw the irregular 
expenditure (which may be replaced by expenditure which is eligible) 
or does not remedy the detected system failures, the European 
Commission may apply financial corrections, leading to a net 
reduction in EU funding‡.  
 
FINDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS  
 
Cohesion policy accounts for €40.6 billion of EU spending in 2010, 
roughly one-third of the total budget of €122bn.  
In their annual report on how the EU's budget was spent in 2010, 
auditors identified the biggest problems in money allocated under the 
cohesion policy. According this report of the ECA 7.7%§ of cohesion 
                                                          
† Article 39(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 (OJ L 161, 
26.6.1999, p. 1); Articles 91 and 92 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1083/2006 (OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, p. 25). 
‡ Article 99 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
§ The Court calculates its estimate of error from a representative statistical 
sample. The figure quoted is the best estimate (known as the MLE). The 
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funding was spent in error or against EU rules. This is a substantial 
increase on the figure for 2009, 5.5%, though it had expected the 
error rate to rise, as member states seek to meet funding 
commitments for projects for the 2007-13 spending period. 
The Commission notes that the large majority of high quantifiable 
errors with strong impact identified by the Court are concentrated in 
seven ERDF operational programmes of three Member States, out of 
the 16 Member States included in the Court's sample
                                                                                                                                  
Court has 95 % confidence that the rate of error in the population lies 
between 4,7 % and 10,7 % (the lower and upper error limits respectively). 
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5.  
 
2010 Summary of findings on regularity of transactions6 
 
Most of the errors, or irregular payments, were because of non-
compliance with public-procurement rules as well as a failure to 
properly apply EU eligibility rules for projects. The Court found errors 
related to non-compliance with EU and national public procurement 
rules in 19 % of the 243 transactions audited. Serious failures to 
respect these rules were identified in 5 % of the transactions audited. 
                                                          
5 Traditionally, neither the ECA nor the Commission ‘names and shames' 
countries. However, the Commission broke that taboo, when named Italy, 
Spain and the Czech Republic as the worst managers of EU cohesion funds. 
These three countries accounted for “two-thirds of errors identified” by the 
ECA in spending of cohesion funds, but the Commission not provided a 
breakdown of the figures.  
6 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET (2011/C 
326/01) 
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They account for 24 % of all quantifiable errors and make up 
approximately 31 % of the estimated error rate for this policy group 
The Court found other compliance and non-quantifiable errors related 
to tendering and contracting procedures in a further 14 % of the 243 
transactions audited. These errors include cases of non-compliance 
with the information and publicity requirements (such as late 
publication of award notices)7, shortcomings in the tender 
specification or procedural weaknesses in the evaluation of offers. 
They also cover cases of incorrect transposition of EU Directives into 
national public procurement laws. These errors are not included in 
the estimation of the error rate. 
The court also found problems in the accountability of special 
financial funds that member states have started to set up to disburse 
EU money. These financial instruments use EU cohesion funds as 
guarantees, loans and equity investments to back local projects. 
 
WHAT IS BEHIND THESE FIGURES, WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF THE HIGH 
ERROR RATE?  
 
DEFINITION PROBLEM  
European legislation8 provides for the protection of the Union’s 
financial interests in all areas of activity. Member States are required 
to notify the European Commission of evidence of fraud and other 
irregularities. This need is particularly evident in those sectors of the 
EU budget where the main responsibility for management is with the 
Member States, namely, in the fields of Agriculture and Cohesion 
Policy (on the expenditure side) and Own Resources (on the revenue 
side). In these areas, Member States must inform the Commission of 
all irregularities involving more than EUR 10 000 of EU finances. This 
                                                          
7 By formal  errors, such as late publication of award notices, it is not 
necessary to impose financial corrections 
8 for Cohesion Policy: Regulations No 1681/94 and 1831/94 for the 
programming periods until the 2000-2006 and by Regulation No 
1828/2006 for the period 2007-2013 
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applies at all stages in the procedure for recovering monies unduly 
paid or not received. 
The practices of the national administrations vary, though 
improvements have been achieved thanks to the efforts made to 
harmonize their approaches. Consequently, a certain proportion of 
communications does not distinguish between suspected fraud and 
irregularity. 
The legal definitions are the following:  
Irregularity: means any infringement of a provision of European law 
resulting from an act or omission by an economic operator which has, 
or would have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the 
European Union or budgets managed by it, either by reducing or 
losing revenue accruing from own resources collected directly on 
behalf of the Union, or by an unjustified item of expenditure9. 
Fraud: affecting the European Communities' financial interests shall 
consist of10: 
a) in respect of expenditure, any intentional act or omission relating 
to: 
– the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements 
or documents, which has as its effect the misappropriation or 
wrongful retention of funds from the general budget of the European 
Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European 
Communities; 
– non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, 
with the same effect; 
– the misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those for 
which they were originally granted; 
b) in respect of revenue, any intentional act or omission relating to: 
                                                          
9 Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2988/95. 
10 Article 1(1), point (a), of the "Convention on the Protection of the European 
Communities' Financial Interests" (PIF Convention). 
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– the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements 
or documents, which has as its effect the illegal diminution of the 
resources of the general budget of the European Communities or 
budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European Communities; 
– non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, 
with the same effect; 
– misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, with the same effect.” 
The concept of irregularity is much wider than that of fraud, which 
explicitly refers to “intentional” act or omission. In this respect, the 
concept of irregularity includes that of fraud, but refers also to a 
whole series of infringements of rules which do not imply a deliberate 
intent to violate or for which such intent is not clear (for instance a 
breach of rules due to the misinterpretation of certain provisions 
because of their complexity). Therefore, the distinction between 
irregularities and fraud is that fraud is a criminal act that can only be 
determined by the outcome of judicial proceedings. As such, it is only 
when the judicial procedure has come to an end that the actual 
amount of fraud can be determined.  
Errors are mainly detected and reported through audits and controls 
by national and Community bodies. Controls and audits take place 
before, during and after money is spent over a period of several years 
as the programmes are multi-annual. An error is any breach of rules 
in using the cohesion policy funds. An error does not mean that funds 
have disappeared, been lost or wasted. An error does not mean 
fraud. While errors are in essence unintentional mistakes, fraud 
implies intentional deception. Errors detected by the European Court 
of Auditors (ECA) are used by the ECA to establish error rates on the 
basis of a sample number of transactions. Error is not a term defined 
in antifraud11. 
                                                          
11 For the employment of the term of "error" see the European Court of 
Auditors' Annual Report of the European Court of Auditors on the 
implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2009, OJ C 
303/02, 9.11.2010. On the methodology of the Court see Annex 1.1 (Audit 
Approach and Methodology) OJ C 303/02, 9.11.2010, p. 34. 
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Because of the different methods to collect the data, the European 
Court of Auditors and the Commission agree that the figures of the 
European Court of Auditors on errors and of the Commission on 
irregularities and financial corrections cannot be compared in a 
meaningful way. 
 
CONTROL PROCESSES BEHIND THE FIGURES  
In 2010 the number of for the Commission reported irregularities and 
related financial amounts involved increased in relation to 2009 and 
represent the highest peak registered so far in the Cohesion Policy. 7 
062 irregularities were received throughout the year, involving an 
overall amount of EUR 1.55 billion, the highest ever. The number of 
irregularities increased by 49%, while the irregular amounts 
increased by 31%.12 
1994-2009 trend concerning number of reported irregularities for the 
Cohesion Policy 
                                                          
12 Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities- Own Resources, Agriculture, 
Cohesion Policy, Pre-Accession Funds and Direct Expenditure-Year 2010 - 
Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission on the 
protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against 
fraud – 2010 {COM(2011) 595 final}{SEC(2011) 1107 final}{SEC(2011) 
1109 final} 
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Since 1998, the impact of reported irregularities on the Cohesion 
Policy budget has showed two important increases, the first in 2002 
and the second in 2009-2010. The increase could be due to a 
number of factors:  
- the increase of the financial resources allocated to this policy; 
- a better overall understanding and implementation of the 
reporting obligation,  
- increased attention and improved controls.  
The main reasons, which could explain these increases, are the 
closure of the programming period 2000-2006 and the advanced 
phase of implementation of the programming period 2007-2013.  
The countries having reported the highest number of irregularities in 
2010 were the United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece and 
Ireland (all having reported more than 600 irregularities). The highest 
irregular amounts were reported by the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, 
the United Kingdom, Spain, Slovakia and Ireland (all above EUR 100 
million). 
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Most frequent types of irregularities reported by Member States13 
 
The vast majority of cases involve irregularities of an “administrative” 
nature that are normally detected in the course of the routine 
documentary checks which are conducted before any payment of EU 
money is made. As a result, among the most frequent types of 
irregularity reported by Member States are the “not eligible 
expenditure” and “missing or incomplete supporting documents”. 
However, the second most important “source” of irregularities is 
‘Infringement of rules concerned with public procurement’, which is 
also resulting in the most “costly” typology, as it involves the highest 
involved irregular amounts. 
Analysis of those categories of irregularity which are the most 
reported shows that irregularity is most frequently identified in the 
implementation phase of the project cycle. However, the biggest 
impact in terms of value (financial impact) occurs in the selection or 
procurement phase. 
                                                          
13 Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities- Own Resources, Agriculture, 
Cohesion Policy, Pre-Accession Funds and Direct Expenditure -Year 2010 - 
Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission on the 
protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against 
fraud – 2010 {COM(2011) 595 final}{SEC(2011) 1107 final}{SEC(2011) 
1109 final} 
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Non-compliance with the rules or conditions attached to EU funding 
will normally disqualify expenditure on a project from reimbursement 
or render it ‘irregular’. The beneficiary may then have to repay part or 
all of the grant received, depending on the nature and seriousness of 
the ‘irregularity’. Such ‘irregularities’ are corrected by removing the 
irregular expenditure from payment claims submitted to the 
Commission and cancelling and recovering the grant from the 
beneficiary. The Member States’ authorities are responsible in the 
first instance for making corrections and recoveries. The Commission 
intervenes only when it establishes that irregular expenditure has not 
been corrected or that the control system for a programme is not 
working, with a consequent risk that irregularities are not being 
detected.  
When the national authorities detect and correct an irregularity, they 
can re-use the EU funding released for other projects. This is an 
incentive to Member States to put in place effective systems.  
If the Commission has to make a correction, it involves a net 
reduction in the EU funding of the programme. When the Commission 
has evidence of significant deficiencies in the functioning of Member 
States’ management and control systems or of irregularities in 
relation to particular payment claims which a Member State has 
failed to prevent, detect or correct, it can interrupt or formally 
suspend payments to the programme concerned or open a financial 
correction procedure. An interruption of payments for a non-
renewable period of up to six months may be ordered as soon as 
there is evidence to suggest that there is a serious system weakness. 
Payments are resumed once the Member State has taken the 
necessary remedial measures. A suspension of payments requires a 
formal decision by the Commission and can continue for an indefinite 
period. If the Member State fails to correct the irregularity or remedy 
the system deficiency, the Commission may apply a financial 
correction by formal decision. Such decisions always entail a net 
reduction in the EU funding of the programme, i.e. the Member State 
cannot re-use the cancelled EU funding for other projects. The 
Commission can apply financial corrections on an extrapolated basis 
for systemic errors and flat-rate corrections for system failures or 
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irregularities whose financial impact is difficult to quantify, for 
example in the public procurement area14.  
An interesting aspect to examine in the framework of the protection 
of the EU financial interests could be how effective the preventive 
action of national authorities is and, when not prevented, what 
proportion of the detected irregular amounts is effectively recovered 
from the beneficiaries. 
Irregular amounts, prevention rate and recovery rate 2000-200615 
                                                          
14 Where systemic or repeated irregularities are detected in the application 
of the rules on public procurement, financial corrections at flat rates or by 
extrapolation (within the meaning of Article 4 of Regulation No 448/2001 or 
Article 99 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006) can be made to all the 
operations and/or programmes affected by the irregularities. 
15 Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities- Own Resources, Agriculture, 
Cohesion Policy, Pre-Accession Funds and Direct Expenditure -Year 2010 - 
Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission on the 
protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against 
fraud – 2010 {COM(2011) 595 final}{SEC(2011) 1107 final}{SEC(2011) 
1109 final} 
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On one hand some caution is needed on these data, because some 
Member States may have not reported the irregularities they 
detected before payment. 
On the other hand in many Member States is a common practice to 
exclude projects flagged as irregular from the expenditure declaration 
to the Commission. This implies that EU resources can be reused to 
finance other eligible projects, but the full burden of recovery is 
shifted on national budgets. When this decision is taken, the 
Commission does not receive any data about recovery of those sums 
and therefore the picture presented here is only partial. 
 
LEGAL ISSUES - LEGISTLATION 
For cohesion policy a general regulation16 defines common principles, 
rules and standards for the implementation of the three cohesion 
                                                          
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
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instruments, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. In addition there 
are different regulations17 on the different funds defines they role and 
fields of interventions. 
The European Commission's implementing regulation18 for the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds 2007-2013 represents one set of 
detailed rules on the management of cohesion policy's financial 
instruments. 
Based on the principle of shared management between the Union 
and the Member States and regions, there are national regulations on 
national implementation issues. 
In the case of public procurement on the EU-level the regulation 
consists of the directives on public procurement, legal acts 
implementing the Directives and a growing body of case law. Member 
States are responsible for the correct transposition of the EC 
Directives into national law. In the worst cases the European 
Commission can act against a Member State with a formal 
infringement procedure, but often this happens only if there are quite 
evident cases of infringement brought to the attention of the EU 
                                                                                                                                  
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1260/1999 
17 Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 July 2006 on the European Regional Development Fund and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1783/1999 
Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 July 2006 on the European Social Fund and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
18 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 of 8 December 2006 setting 
out rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 
laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and of Regulation 
(EC) No 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Regional Development Fund 
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Commission. In most cases national law will not evidently contradict 
the EC Directive, but it could give a misleading interpretation. The 
Commission applies EC Directives rationale, when auditing public 
procurement in cohesion policy programmes. 
Under Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, operations 
financed by the Funds must be in conformity with the provisions of 
the Treaty, with instruments adopted under it and with Community 
policies, including on the award of public contracts. The same 
obligations have been provided for the programming period 2007-
2013 under Article 9, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Regulation (EC) No 
1083/2006. 
Contracting entities from Member States have to comply with the 
rules and principles of the EC Treaty whenever they conclude public 
contracts falling into the scope of that Treaty. These principles 
include the free movement of goods, the right of establishment, the 
freedom to provide services, non-discrimination and equal treatment, 
transparency, proportionality and mutual recognition19. 
In operational programs it is necessary to ensure that certain public 
procurements are transparent and accessible to bidders in other 
Member States as this is required by some principles outlines in the 
EU Treaty. The European Commission Interpretative Communication 
on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully 
subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives20 
outlines the opinion of the European Commission on the application 
of internal market principles of the EU Treaty to all planned contracts 
potentially relevant to the Internal Market (including contracts below 
EU thresholds). The Interpretative Communication is not directly 
legally binding to Member States, but it provides guidance and 
                                                          
19 Commission interpretative communication n° 2006/C 179/02 on the 
Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the 
provisions of the Public Procurement Directives 
20 European Commission Interpretative Communication 2006/C 179/02 on 
the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to 
the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives 
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interpretation on the application of legally binding principles of the EU 
Treaty.21  
The Commission set out guidelines22 even for the financial 
corrections to be applied for irregularities in the application of the 
Community regulations on public procurement to contracts co-
financed by the Structural Funds or the Cohesion Fund during the 
programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007- 2013. When the 
Commission services detect such irregularities during audits, they 
must determine the amount of the financial correction applicable. If, 
when the Commission proposes a correction, the Member State does 
not agree to make the correction itself in accordance with Article 
39(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 or the Article 98 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, the correction is made by 
Commission decision under Article 39 paragraph 3 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1260/1999 or the Article 99 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006.  
The control authorities of the Member States may also detect 
irregularities of the same type during their controls. In this case, they 
are required to make the necessary corrections in accordance with 
Article 39 paragraph 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 or the 
Article 98 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. The competent 
authorities in the Member States are recommended to apply the 
same criteria and rates when correcting irregularities detected by 
their own services during the checks and audits under Articles 4 and 
10 of Regulation (EC) 438/2001 and Articles 60 (b) and 62(1) (a) 
and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 and other checks, unless 
they apply yet stricter standards. 
                                                          
21 As stated in the introduction of the Interpretative Communication: “... The 
Commission sheds light on its understanding of the European Court of 
Justice Case Law and suggests best practices in order to help the Member 
States to reap the full benefit of the Internal Market. This communication 
does not create any new legislative rules. It should be noted that, in any 
event, interpretation of Community law is ultimately the role of the European 
Court of Justice.” 
22 Guidelines for determining financial corrections to be made to expenditure 
cofinanced by the structural funds or the cohesion fund for non-compliance 
with the rules on public procurement, COCOF 07/0037/03-en, European 
Commission 
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The guidelines give amounts and rates of financial corrections where 
irregular applications for payment are presented. The more serious 
the non-compliance, the higher the % cut applied. These are 
reasoned not only with public procurement regulations, but  
confirmed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case-law too, that 
the rules and the principles of the EC Treaty apply also to contracts 
outside the scope of the Public Procurement Directives. 
To summarize it: this document is used by the European Commission 
to determine financial corrections and is an information source on 
Commission expectations related to procurement processes. This 
document is not binding to Member States but Commission Auditors 
use it as a basis to apply financial correction. It is thus recommended 
for Member States to apply similar correction rates, unless stricter 
national rules apply. The European Commission might apply 
additional cuts, in cases where cuts made by the Member States are 
considered too low.  
 
LEGAL ISSUES - PRACTICE 
In the implementation of cohesion policy the central problem is that 
there are three levels of administration dealing with funds and 
contributing match funding: the EU, the national governments and the 
regional administrations. Each level has its own views on how things 
should be done and this adds to the complexity. In addition to the 
central problem described above, there are a number of specific 
problems, for examples: unclear and vague regulations, complex 
approval systems for programmes and projects, inconsistency with 
other major EU policies such as state aids and environment policy or 
public procurement and too many administrative requirements, too 
many checks by too many bodies. 
The existing public procurement legislation and practice needs to be 
revised and modernized too. The principles of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply an obligation of 
transparency which, according to the ECJ case-law, "consists in 
ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of 
advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up 
to competition and the impartiality of the procedures to be reviewed". 
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But the savings generated by the EU procurement process far 
outweighed the costs of the procedures themselves, because of 
these complexity. However, there is wide diversity between member 
states in the time taken and costs of procurement procedures. Many 
national and regional public procurement regulations allow direct 
awarding of contracts (i.e. without any public procurement procedure) 
below a certain contract value. At the same time the principles of 
transparency outlined in the Interpretative Communication have to be 
observed, leading to an inherent contradiction between national 
(regional) public procurement laws (allowing for direct contract 
awards) and the procurement rules of the European Community 
(emphasizing the need to advertise planned awards in case of 
relevance to the internal market).  
European Commission auditors will apply the transparency rules and 
undertake financial corrections at the cohesion projects if the 
principle was not applied. National procurement experts will apply 
national laws. For small contracts the proportionality principle applies 
as it is hard to justify administrative efforts associated with the 
publication of small economic values. The principle of value for 
money applies in any case (also for direct awards of small economic 
value) and measures should be taken to ensure that money is not 
wasted. 
But the main reason for uncertainties and inefficiencies is the need 
for development projects to apply not only public procurement but 
also Cohesion Policy rules. These two sets of rules are each very 
complicated and hard to implement and were written with quite 
different intentions and mind sets and can thus be contradictory. 
Often straightforward solutions offering 100% certainty are simply not 
available. It is important to keep in mind that gold plating of public 
procurement or Cohesion Policy rules is often no solution at all. 
Instead, understanding the intentions behind the two sets of rules 
and making informed decisions tends to be the way. But in this 
situation it is really difficult applying the law correctly. It is good 
practice to take decisions carefully and state reasoning in writing. 
Unfortunately other people might arrive at different conclusions and 
documentation of your reasoning can be very useful. 
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One other special problem: many cooperation projects and 
programmes (ETC) currently struggle with the fact that public 
procurement rules do not foresee joint procurement by several 
contracting authorities from different Member States with different 
public procurement rules. More specifically, there is presently no 
procurement procedure available that would allow project partners to 
procure a service jointly across national borders (e.g. one joint 
procurement of project partners for the management of the entire 
cooperation project). Therefore, in the framework of the current legal 
situation, it requires creativity and the application of professional 
judgment to deal with public procurement in ETC programmes and 
projects. In ETC most purchases of goods, works and services are 
carried out for contract values below the EU thresholds. As the Public 
Procurement Directives do not apply to these procurements, national 
rules apply in the individual Member States, which differ from country 
to country. Harmonization of the national rules below the EU 
threshold would be highly desirable in the context of ETC, but this is 
unlikely to happen in the near future. 
Some European development programmes – typically in which are 
involved not-EU-Member States countries as well - established 
specific public procurement rules for beneficiaries participating in 
projects. These rules are always stricter than national rules. 
Experience has shown that some of these rules are more useful than 
others. One may also raise the question why cohesion policy 
programmes should be stricter than procurement law itself. 
Furthermore, requiring private companies to apply the rules can 
discourage privates from participating even though they are eligible in 
many programmes. On a programme level, it could be more effective 
to ensure that general principles are obeyed. Other examples of 
potentially useful programme rules relate to the application of 
Commission guidelines in programmes and projects. In that sense, it 
could be useful to establish rules that require applying the guidelines 
for determining financial corrections. It could also be useful to require 
project partners to apply the transparency principles to procurements 
below a certain threshold. 
 
PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE 
Nyikos &  Tatrai 
2250 
 
The issue of simplification has been a concern for a long time, and 
will remain so during the next programming period as for cohesion 
policy as for public procurement. 
The Europe 2020 strategy23 stresses the importance to improve 
public procurement rules. The public authorities spend 18% of GDP 
on goods, services and works24. Given the current budgetary 
restrictions and economic difficulties in most Member States, public 
procurement policy must, more than ever, ensure the optimal use of 
funds in order foster growth and job creation and thereby help to 
achieve the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
The Single Market Act for a highly competitive social market economy 
committing: “Revised and modernized public procurement legislative 
framework, with a view to underpinning a balanced policy which 
fosters demand for environmentally sustainable, socially responsible 
and innovative goods, services and works. This revision should also 
result in simpler and more flexible procurement procedures for 
contracting authorities and provide easier access for companies, 
especially SMEs.” 
The proper financial management of EU funds is important to avoid 
fraud and illegitimate spending.  
On the one hand, it's a clear hint in the direction of EU Member States 
to do their homework and learn how to handle proper public 
procurements. Many EU funded projects are not exactly transparent 
in the selection of contractors, which raises legitimate concerns 
about the effective use of these huge amounts of public money. 
                                                          
23 Europe 2020 is the EU's growth strategy for the coming decade, about 
how the EU should become a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. 
Concretely, the Union has set five ambitious objectives - on employment, 
innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy - to be reached by 
2020. Each Member State has adopted its own national targets in each of 
these areas. Concrete actions at EU and national levels underpin the 
strategy. 
24 European Commission 
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On the other hand, some of the irregularities will also be an effect of 
the still high and often unnecessary administrative burdens for 
cohesion policy accounting - an issue perpetuated at both EU and 
national level. Adding this, the uncertainties and incoherencies the 
public procurement versus cohesion policy rules has a significant 
effect as well of the number of irregularities.  
If we want a more effective system with fewer irregularities, then for 
the stakeholders it is necessary to move from the legal level of 
understanding and trying to implement the intentions behind the two 
sets of rules (cohesion – public procurement) to the higher level of 
legal certainties with clear and simple legislation.  
The revision of the public procurement directives announced by the 
Commission 20 December 2011 is part of an overall programme to 
thoroughly modernize public tendering in the European Union. The 
proposed reform aims to thoroughly modernize the existing tools and 
instruments. In its legislative proposal for the future cohesion policy 
the European Commission proposed to simplify the procedures in 
order to lessen some of the burden of the implementing authorities.  
The answer of the question if the new regulation will fit their stated 
wish for “radical simplification”, “effective and efficient system” and 
“reduce costs for business” can be the topic for further research. 
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